Delta Law FDI Desk | Supreme People's Court 最高人民法院, typical case batch released 2025-01-02
- Case name 案例名称:上海兰某贸易有限公司与江某等损害公司利益责任纠纷案 (a foreign-invested trading company against its general manager and related parties, liability for damage to company interests)
- Case number 案例编号:最高人民法院《首批依法保护外商投资权益典型案例》案例一,2025 年 1 月 2 日发布
- Effective judgment 生效裁判:【一审案号】上海市第二中级人民法院(2023)沪 02 民初 55 号;官方发布文本载明「一审判决后,各方均未上诉」
- Keywords 关键词:官方发布文本未单设关键词栏;官方案例标题载明「准确判定高管自我交易行为 及时维护外资企业合法权益」
- Provisions cited officially 官方载明的相关法条:官方裁判结果引用公司法(2018 年修正)第一百四十八条第一款第四项;官方典型意义载明现行对应条文为 2023 年修订的公司法第一百八十二条第二款
- Why this case 为什么选它:『我们从法国派不了人常驻,日常管理全交给本地总经理——他签的合同,我们怎么知道对面是不是他自己家的公司?』这是外方股东最难自查的一类风险,因为签字、付款、验收全部合规,问题只出在合同另一头的股权穿透上。
1. The facts as officially published 基本案情
2013年9月,法国兰某公司与法国、比利时其他投资人共同设立上海兰某贸易有限公司(以下简称上海兰某公司)。江某担任上海兰某公司总经理,全面负责公司日常管理工作。2017年9月,上海兰某公司与澜某公司签订《装潢工程合同》,委托澜某公司对办公场所进行室内装修。后嘉某公司替代澜某公司进场施工,上海兰某公司向嘉某公司支付装修款1,508,323.50元。江某的配偶钟某持有嘉某公司99%股权,但江某未向上海兰某公司报告该情况。上海兰某公司认为,江某利用职务之便,通过与嘉某公司签订合同,将远高于实际费用的装修费用转移至嘉某公司及钟某名下,江某及嘉某公司存在侵占上海兰某公司财产的行为,故诉请主张赔偿。
In 2013-09 a French company and other French and Belgian investors jointly established a trading company in Shanghai. Jiang served as its general manager with overall responsibility for day-to-day management. In 2017-09 the Shanghai company signed a decoration works contract engaging one contractor to fit out its offices. A second company later replaced that contractor on site, and the Shanghai company paid it decoration fees of RMB 1,508,323.50. The general manager's spouse, Zhong, held 99% of the equity of that second company, and the general manager did not report this to the Shanghai company. The Shanghai company took the view that the general manager had used the position to route decoration costs far above actual cost to that company and to Zhong, and that the general manager and that company had misappropriated its property; it sued for compensation.
Unofficial translation; the Chinese text as officially published prevails.
Read the sequence again, because the shape of it is what makes the risk hard to see from the shareholder's side. A contract was signed with one contractor. A different company then performed the work and took the money. Nothing in that substitution is unusual in a fit-out project, and nothing on the payment records would have looked wrong to an investor reading a management report from another country.
The defect sat one layer below the paperwork: the equity register of the company that actually got paid. That register was a matter of public record, and it is the layer at which any screening routine has to operate.
Two features of this structure are worth naming for a foreign investor. First, the counterparty was not the manager. It was a company controlled by a relative, which is precisely the arrangement that a narrow reading of the old self-dealing rule would have left outside its scope. Second, the loss was not the whole payment. The claim that succeeded was for the margin above fair value, not for the fit-out cost itself, and that distinction determined how much came back.
2. The official holding 裁判要旨(官方原文)
上海市第二中级人民法院审理认为,根据《中华人民共和国公司法》(以下简称公司法)(2018年修正)第一百四十八条第一款第四项规定,董事、高级管理人员除公司章程规定或股东会同意外,不得与本公司订立合同或进行交易。本案中,江某系上海兰某公司高级管理人员,在上海兰某公司章程未规定准许董事、高级管理人员同本公司订立合同或进行交易的情况下,江某欲促成嘉某公司与上海兰某公司开展交易,理应基于自身负有的忠实义务,主动向上海兰某公司股东会披露其配偶钟某持有嘉某公司99%股权并直接控制公司的事实,以便上海兰某公司股东会决定是否同意与其订立合同或进行交易。江某故意隐瞒其与嘉某公司的高度关联关系,代表上海兰某公司与嘉某公司进行交易,违反了公司法第一百四十八条第一款第四项的规定。遂判决江某与嘉某公司、钟某将超出市场公允价值的交易所得342,861.50元返还给上海兰某公司。一审判决后,各方均未上诉。
The Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People's Court held that under the article of the Company Law as amended in 2018 that was applied in this case, directors and senior officers may not contract or deal with their own company save as provided by the articles of association or with the consent of the shareholders' meeting. The general manager was a senior officer; the articles contained no permission for such dealing; and the duty of loyalty required a voluntary disclosure to the shareholders' meeting of the fact that the spouse held 99% of the contracting company and directly controlled it, so that the shareholders' meeting could decide whether to consent. By deliberately concealing that close connection and dealing with that company on the Shanghai company's behalf, the general manager breached the provision. The court ordered the general manager, the contracting company and the spouse to return the gains above fair market value, RMB 342,861.50, to the Shanghai company. No party appealed.
Unofficial translation; the Chinese text as officially published prevails.
外国投资者在中国进行投资时,往往依靠企业高管对其投资设立的企业进行管理,公司法关于高管对公司勤勉义务和忠实义务的规定是保障外国投资者权益的重要法律依据。外商在中国投资设立的公司属于中国的市场主体之一,受中国公司法的平等保护。
2023年修订的公司法第一百八十二条第二款将自我交易的范围扩大至包括“其近亲属直接或者间接控制的企业”,本案采取的实质性解释方法在公司法修订中得到充分认可和体现。
Foreign investors investing in China commonly rely on senior officers to manage the enterprises they establish, and the Company Law rules on the duties of diligence and loyalty owed by those officers are an important legal basis for protecting investor interests; a company established in China with foreign investment is one of China's market participants and receives equal protection under Chinese company law. The published note further records that the second paragraph of article 182 of the Company Law as revised in 2023 extends self-dealing to cover enterprises directly or indirectly controlled by close relatives, and that the substantive interpretation taken in this case was recognised and reflected in that revision.
Unofficial translation; the Chinese text as officially published prevails.
The published note does something unusually helpful here: it maps the old provision onto the new one itself. The rule the court applied was the 2018 text; the current text is article 182, and its second paragraph now says on its face what the court reached by interpretation. A foreign shareholder reading the case today does not need to argue for an extension of scope. The scope is written into the statute.
Note what the remedy was measured against. The order was to return the gains above fair market value, not the whole payment. That means someone had to establish what fair market value was for that fit-out. Valuation evidence, not indignation, produced the figure.
3. Practical guidance 律师实务提示
Set the consent route in the articles before you need it. 《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百八十二条 splits the obligation into two steps that are easy to confuse: the officer must report the matter to the board or the shareholders' meeting, and the transaction must then be approved by resolution of whichever organ the articles designate. A foreign parent that leaves the articles silent, as happened here, keeps the veto but also keeps the argument. Naming the organ, the reporting threshold and the connected-person definition in the articles turns a later dispute into a document check.
Assemble three things before you claim. First, the connection: a current extract showing who holds the counterparty's equity, and the relationship to the officer. Second, the price: an independent valuation of what the work or goods were worth, because the recoverable amount here was the margin above fair value rather than the invoice. Third, the absence of consent: the articles, the minute books and the board papers for the relevant period, showing that no report was made and no resolution passed.
Choose the right claim for the right money. 《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百八十六条 gives the company the income derived from breaches of the connected-transaction and related duties, while 《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百八十八条 gives damages for loss caused by an officer acting in breach of law, regulation or the articles. The two do not measure the same sum, and neither is mentioned in the official release; they are raised here only as current-rule checks. Where the loss exceeds the officer's gain, a claim framed only as disgorgement leaves money on the table.
4. What this means in your situation 把要点落到你的处境
第一百八十二条 董事、监事、高级管理人员,直接或者间接与本公司订立合同或者进行交易,应当就与订立合同或者进行交易有关的事项向董事会或者股东会报告,并按照公司章程的规定经董事会或者股东会决议通过。
董事、监事、高级管理人员的近亲属,董事、监事、高级管理人员或者其近亲属直接或者间接控制的企业,以及与董事、监事、高级管理人员有其他关联关系的关联人,与公司订立合同或者进行交易,适用前款规定。
第一百八十六条 董事、监事、高级管理人员违反本法第一百八十一条至第一百八十四条规定所得的收入应当归公司所有。
Article 182: a director, supervisor or senior officer who contracts or deals with the company directly or indirectly shall report the matter to the board or the shareholders' meeting and obtain approval by resolution of the board or the shareholders' meeting as provided in the articles of association. The preceding paragraph also applies where the counterparty is a close relative of such a person, an enterprise directly or indirectly controlled by such a person or by a close relative, or another connected person. Article 186: income obtained in breach of articles 181 to 184 belongs to the company.
Unofficial translation; the Chinese text as officially published prevails.
| What the official release holds | What it controls | What it means for you |
|---|---|---|
| Self-dealing reaches an enterprise controlled by the officer's close relative | Scope of the prohibition | Screen counterparties by equity holder, not by name similarity |
| Silence in the articles means no permission | Whether consent existed | Draft the consent route in; do not rely on general practice |
| The duty of loyalty required voluntary disclosure | Who must speak first | Build a standing declaration of interests into the officer's terms |
| Recovery was the gain above fair market value | Measure of the remedy | Commission a valuation early; it sets the number you can recover |
| The 2023 revision writes the extended scope into article 182 | Current legal basis | You argue application today, not extension |
- Misconception: the rule only catches contracts signed with the officer personally. In fact: the official 典型意义 records that the revised statute extends the scope to 「其近亲属直接或者间接控制的企业」.
- Misconception: a foreign-invested company is governed by some separate regime rather than ordinary Chinese company law. In fact: the official 典型意义 records that 「外商在中国投资设立的公司属于中国的市场主体之一,受中国公司法的平等保护」.
- Misconception: if the shareholders never approved it, the company gets the whole payment back. In fact: the official 裁判结果 records that in 本案 the order was to return 「超出市场公允价值的交易所得342,861.50元」.
- Misconception: the manager can wait to be asked about a conflict. In fact: the official 裁判结果 records that in 该案 the duty of loyalty required the officer 「主动向上海兰某公司股东会披露其配偶钟某持有嘉某公司99%股权并直接控制公司的事实」.
- Corporate governance and compliance for foreign-invested companies in China
- Published cases on foreign investment in China
- Laws and regulations on foreign investment in China
- An Arbitration Clause in the Joint Venture Contract and the Derivative Suit It Stalled (forthcoming in this batch)
- Company Chops Held by a Removed Legal Representative: Injunctive Preservation in a Wholly Foreign-Owned Company (forthcoming in this batch)
- ① 最高人民法院《首批依法保护外商投资权益典型案例》案例一《上海兰某贸易有限公司与江某等损害公司利益责任纠纷案》,最高人民法院新闻局 2025 年 1 月 2 日发布,官方页 https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun/xiangqing/451771.html 。
- ② 生效裁判:【一审案号】上海市第二中级人民法院(2023)沪 02 民初 55 号;官方发布文本载明各方均未上诉。
- ③ 本页引用:《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百八十二条、第一百八十六条、第一百八十八条,依 2023 年 12 月 29 日第十四届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第七次会议第二次修订、自 2024 年 7 月 1 日起施行的文本,现行有效,官方页 http://www.npc.gov.cn/c2/c30834/202312/t20231229_433999.html 。
- Status and timing note 效力与时点提示:本案为最高人民法院发布的典型案例,供审判参考,不具有指导性案例的参照效力;in English, it is published for reference and does not carry the effect of a guiding case. 条号出处已分开:公司法(2018 年修正)第一百四十八条第一款第四项系官方裁判结果引用的旧法条文,现行对应条文为《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百八十二条第二款——该对应关系由官方典型意义自行载明,本页照录;第一百八十六条、第一百八十八条系官方发布文本未涉及的现行规则,本页仅作提示,不是本案的裁判依据。公司登记与备案等程序性事项 subject to the current published requirements of the accepting authority。
- 本页案例引自官方公开发布,非本所承办案件展示,不构成对具体个案的法律意见。This case is drawn from an official public release and is not a showcase of matters handled by this firm, and does not constitute legal advice on any specific case.
This article is general legal research and does not constitute legal advice. 本文为一般性法律研究,不构成法律意见。